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Abstract In the early 1990s Greece accepted a large number of immigrants from a
variety of contexts. Since then ‘organised criminality’ has become an important
aspect of the immigration nexus in the country, and ethnicity has been viewed as an
extremely important-if not the primary–explanatory variable. Simultaneously, there
has been very little empirical research on ‘organised crime’ in Greece in general and
‘organised crime’ and ethnicity in particular. The purpose of this article, which is
based on previous research that the author has conducted on three illegal markets in
Greece (a. migrant smuggling business, b. the cigarette black market, and c. the
market of stolen cars and car parts), is to show the extent to which these illegal
markets are controlled by foreign nationals, and establish whether there is such thing
as an ‘alien conspiracy’ in the particular country.
Introduction
The relationship between ethnicity, migration, and ‘organized crime’ has been one of
the most widely researched issues in criminology. In fact ethnicity, migration, and
‘organized crime’ are terms that evolved together especially in the American context,
which was unwilling to accept that “…modes of criminality, which are perceived as
especially menacing” ([24]: 824–825) can be a native feature. Some authors have
argued that ethnicity and migration, through to the exclusion, marginalization, and
blocking of legitimate opportunities, are characteristics that facilitate ‘organized
crime’. Bell [9], for example, saw ‘organized crime’ as the ultimate attempt by the
migrants in the United States to move towards the upper echelons of the American
society, and pursue their American Dream (see also [31]). Some others talked about
an ‘alien conspiracy’ undermining the American way of life and market, a very
popular perspective especially after World War II. Thus, although the concept of
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‘organized crime’ initially had no ethnic connotation [55], the notions of ethnicity
and migration have been at the core, and in the media and public perception the
phenomenon is represented at its best by the ‘Mafia’ (see [10]), Jewish, Irish and
other migrant ‘organized crime’ groups, which were thought to be overrunning the
illegal markets in the United States. In Europe, although the debate on ‘organized
crime’ and illegal markets was not continuously preoccupied with ethnicity (see, for
example, [25, 55]), similar research on the involvement of ethnic minorities and
foreigners in ‘organized crime’ has been conducted. Although there are a number of
authors, who reject the ethnic model as an important explanatory element, as
Bovenkerk et al. [13] suggest, the image of the ethnically distinct ‘organized crime’
group is “…adhered to not only by the public but also by most criminologists…”.
‘Organized crime’ has been largely viewed as an ‘alien conspiracy’ [42], and this has
constituted one of the most influential perspectives on ‘organised crime’ discourse,
one that has greatly influenced how ‘organised crime’ has been viewed as well as the
design of public policy against ‘organised crime’.
In the early 1990s Greece accepted a large number of foreigners as immigrants
from a variety of contexts. It is extremely difficult to provide accurate figures
regarding the number of foreigners as there are an unknown number of
undocumented foreigners in the country. However, we could provide the numbers
of documented foreigners. According to the last Greek Census in 2001 the total of
documented foreigners in Greece was 797,091 [17]1 in a population of 10,964,020.
The largest foreign group by far are the Albanians and are followed by Bulgarians,
Georgians, Romanians, Russians, and Ukrainians.
Since the very beginning of the 1990s ‘organised criminality’ has become an
important aspect of the immigration nexus in Greece, and ethnicity has been viewed
as an extremely important—if not the primary-explanatory variable. As Xenakis [61]
has argued, it was in the 1990s that ‘organised crime’ was defined and understood as
a problem in the Greek context. The ‘organised’ criminality of non-Greeks in Greece
has been a political and academic ‘hot potato’. It is a fact that connecting minorities
and migrants (terms that already have an emotional appeal, see [50]), with crime and
‘organized crime’ has been a practice that led to a “number of theoretical and
political miscalculations and misconceptions” ([12]: 110), and fuelled the ‘crime-
prone foreigner’ stereotype. However, avoiding or turning a blind eye to the topic of
the relationship between ethnicity and ‘organised crime’ in Greece altogether would
be at the expense of both Greeks and foreigners. This is because at the moment the
stereotype of the ‘organised’, foreign criminal is very well consolidated in the Greek
social consciousness, ethnicity remains at the core of public discourse on ‘organized
crime’ in the country, and clear answers about the link between foreigners and
‘organised crime’ are needed.
Simultaneously, there has been very little research on ‘organised crime’ in Greece
in general, and ‘organised crime’ and ethnicity in particular. The purpose of this
article, which is based on previously published or publicised research that the author
1 This is the number of foreigners as opposed to immigrants from specific countries that are subjected to
criminalising processes (e.g. non EU Europeans such as Albanians). The term foreigners includes
individuals who are immigrants and non-immigrant foreigners who, for instance, come from European
Union member states.
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has conducted on three illegal markets in Greece (migrant smuggling business, [6];
the cigarette black market, [5]; and the market of stolen cars and car parts, [4]), is to
show the extent to which these illegal markets are ‘controlled’ or ‘owned’ by foreign
nationals, and establish whether there is such thing as an ‘alien conspiracy’ in the
particular country. This endeavour is based on the assumption that the aforemen-
tioned illegal markets are part of the body of knowledge widely defined as
‘organised crime’ (see [56] analysis on the study of the cigarette black market as a
contribution to the study on ‘organised crime’).2 The following table indicates the
sources of information and data used during the author’s empirical research on the
three illegal markets (Table 1).
2 Despite the fact that what is perceived as ‘organised crime’ does not only involve illegal markets (see, for
instance, [59]).
Table 1 Sources of information and data, by illegal market
Illegal market Sources of information and data
Migrant smuggling
business [6]
-Interviews with Hellenic police officers in 2002;
-Unpublished statistics on individuals arrested for migrant smuggling
obtained from the Hellenic Police in 2003. These statistics refer
to the first 8 months of 2000 and 2001;
-Interviews with Albanian and Kurdish migrants living in southwest Greece
(2002 and 2004);
-Interviews with two Kurdish individuals, who were actively involved in the
smuggling of migrants
Cigarette black
market [5]
-Official statistics from the Hellenic Coast Guard and the Customs
Authority;
-Interviews with cigarette smugglers (three Kurdish retired cigarette
smugglers, a Greek retired procurer, a Greek retired bootlegger
and two ‘runners’);
-Pre-trial reports from the Hellenic Coast Guard and the Hellenic Police;
-Annual reports on ‘organised crime’ for the years 2004 and 2005 published
by the Hellenic Ministry of Public Order (MPO);
-Articles from high-circulation newspapers, financial and business news
papers, locally circulated newspapers and press releases from
the Ministry of Mercantile Marine and the Bureau for Special Inspections
(Ypiresia Eidikon Eleghon – YP.E.E.);
-Interviews with customers of the cigarette black market
Market of stolen
cars and car parts [4]
-Statistics from the Hellenic Ministry of Public Order (MPO);
-Articles from high-circulation national and local newspapers;
-Pre-trial reports from the Hellenic police;
-Interviews with Hellenic police in 2002 & 2007;
-Informal conversations with employees & entrepreneurs in the legal car
business;
-Interview with engineer from the Directorate of Transportation;
-Interview with used car dealer selling stolen cars;
-Interviews with 2 professional car thieves
For the analytic methodologies please refer to original sources as indicated in the table
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In the following sections there will be a focus on: (a) the representation of
‘organised crime’ as an imported feature and the representation of the foreign
‘organised criminal’ in Greece and (b) the case studies of the three illegal markets
researched. This article will finish with a discussion and a concluding section.
‘Alien conspiracy’: The ‘other’ vs. Greece
According to Potter [42], who has summarised the work of previous researchers and
theorists such as Cressey [14] and Schelling [45], the basic tenets or propositions of
the Alien Conspiracy Theory are:
➢ ‘Organised crime’ is a foreign thing. Something that is imported from abroad
and is often associated with established ethnic minorities or recent
unassimilated and often assimilated migrant groups [47].
➢ ‘Organised crime’ is the business of powerful, rigid, hierarchical, Mafia
‘organisations’ similar or identical to those in cinematographic accounts (e.g.
The Godfather) that resemble legal businesses, corporations or even law
enforcement agencies (see [14]).
➢ ‘Organised crime’ groups have the objective of monopolising an illegal
market and expanding it even to an international level.
➢ ‘Organised crime’ groups engage in a ‘campaign’ to corrupt public officials,
who are seen as essential for the smooth running of the business [45].
➢ ‘Organised crime’ groups engage in a campaign to corrupt the fiscal
structures.
➢ Ethnicity is a key variable by which individuals are selected in / recruited by
‘organised crime organisations’ [14, 42].
Although these tenets have been-directly or indirectly-critiqued by a number of
theorists and researchers (e.g. [11, 23, 37, 40, 46, 51, 60]), they continue being quite
powerful in official and media discourse. The aforementioned tenets have been
integral to the perception of ‘organised crime’ in Greece in the 1990s, a perception
that is extremely persistent even today. In the beginning of the 1990s Greece
introduced an immigration law, Law 1975 of 1991, the mentality of which as well
the initial link between foreigners and ‘organised crime’, becomes clear in its
introductory text where it is stated that foreigners create enormous social problems,
and try to resolve their problems by being involved in criminal activities such as—
among other–drug trafficking [26].
Clearly, in the beginning of 1990s the discussions on migration policies were in
essence identified with discussions on ‘organised’ crime, conventional criminality,
and crime control. It was then that for the first time ‘organised crime’ started to be
perceived as a major issue for the Greek context despite the fact that what could be
labelled as ‘organised criminal activities’ have existed in the country for centuries
(see, for instance, [19, 29]). The Greek media created a climate of threat and
‘ontological (in)security’, as Giddens [20] would argue, and became the very root of
a ‘moral panic’ based on the social awareness of ‘organised crime’ (see [18]), which
in turn was based on the stereotype of the ‘Other’ (see [28]). Great emphasis was
given to some forms of ‘organised criminality’, which were considered unknown to
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the Greek context. Until the point of foreigners’ entrance in Greece ‘organised
crime’ was a synonym of the Italian Mafia and La Cosa Nostra, and the Colombian
cocaine trafficking Cartels all of which, however, were viewed either as
cinematographically interesting to the Greek public or distant from the Greek
reality. Indeed ‘organised crime’ was seen as a very un-Greek thing, the importation
of which coincided with the entrance of foreigners in the country in the beginning of
the 1990s. However, these sensational terms such as the Mafia and the Cartel have
been unquestionably used by the media as if they have been objectively representing
the situation with ‘organised crime’ and illegal markets in the country.
The stereotype of the foreign ‘organised criminal’ was further reinforced by a
number of high profile incidents in the late 1990s. These incidents were viewed
through the prism of ‘organised crime’, even though evidence of a link between the
individuals ‘starring’ in the incidents and ‘organised crime’ was absent. For
example, the case of Flamur Pisli, a young Albanian, who being armed with an
AK-47 and two hand grenades, held the passengers and the driver of a bus as
hostages in May 1999. One of Pisli’s requests, namely to be given passage to
Albania, was granted. The Greek media were talking about “a reception that
Albanian mafia was organising for Pisli” and about “some members of the Albanian
mafia cheering for the hostage-taker’s success” (see [21]). However, Pisli was a
socially isolated offender and no ‘Albanian mafia’ link was ever established.
It is plausible to argue that these representations must have had an effect on how
the Greek public views the issue of criminality of migrants including ‘organised
criminality’. Antonopoulos [2] in his study on public perceptions of migrant
criminality and tendency of reporting migrant criminality found that the Greek
public are adamant that migrants have altered the nature of crime in the country by
‘importing’ a number of criminal activities that were unknown to the Greek context
before early 1990s such as drug trafficking, arms trafficking, women and children
trafficking, and migrant smuggling among other.
Similar views are held by law enforcement agencies. In 1998 the Anti-Organised
Crime Squad (Soma Dioksis Organomenou Eglimatos) was established in Athens.
The squad’s main concern was Russian ‘organised crime’. Greek law enforcement
agencies have also produced data compiled in official reports that signify the
importance of ethnicity as a description and analysis variable when it comes to
‘organised crime’ in Greece. This is reflected in the Annual Organised Crime
Reports (AOCR), which have been based on data and information provided by law
enforcement agencies and have been published by the Greek Ministry of Public
Order (MPO)3. Lambropoulou [29] expresses reservations over the definition of
‘organised criminal activities’ by the MPO as well as its evaluation. We share similar
reservations; however, in the current article we are interested in ‘organised crime’
representations too, which AOCR are an integral part of. The AOCR make explicit
reference to the threat posed by non-indigenous ‘organised crime groups’.
Specifically, the 1999 AOCR suggests that “the ethnic crime groups that constituted
a specific threat… in 1999 were the Albanians, Russians, Bulgarians, Romanians,
Turkish, Iraqi, and in some cases Pakistani and groups of Bangladeshi nationals…”
3 In 2007 the Ministry of Public Order was merged with the Ministry for the Interior.
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([32]: 2). The AOCR also make reference to the ethnicity of ‘criminal organ-
isations’4 and specifically the ‘vast majority’ of their ‘members’. According to the
AOCR of 2004 and 2005 [33, 34] out of 317 ‘criminal organisations’, 110 (34.7%)
comprised of foreign nationals only, 110 (34.7%) comprised of Greek nationals only,
and a further 78 (24.6%) comprised of Greek and foreign nationals although-
similarly to ‘organised’ crime reports in other contexts (e.g. Germany, see [57]) – the
degree and nature of collaboration among Greek and foreign nationals is unclear.
The ethnic identity of the remaining 19 ‘criminal organisations’ could not be
established. The AOCR also make reference to specific ethnic groups and their
involvement in specific ‘organised criminal activities’. For example, the AOCR for
2004 [33] refers to ‘Albanian criminal organisations’ involved in drug trafficking,
robberies and thefts, Turkish, Iraqi, Chinese and Pakistani ‘criminal organisations’
involved in migrant smuggling, Bulgarian ‘criminal organisations’ involved in
counterfeiting and fraud, Romanian ‘criminal organisations’ involved in human
trafficking, and Russian and Ukrainian ‘criminal organisations’ involved in cigarette
smuggling. The 2004 AOCR also offers a more threatening aspect of these ‘criminal
organisations’ by suggesting that the above ‘organisations’ “activities…remain
stable over time and appear not to be affected by external or internal factors…”
([33]: 6).
The Greek economy is also portrayed as in danger due to the foreign illegal
marketers. In an article appearing in the Greek daily Ethnos, for instance, it is estimated
that the illegal trade of several commodities by 50,000 migrants results in € 2 billion
in taxes being evaded [27]. In the same article the Chair of the Commerce Association
of Piraeus argued that “...the illegals have been operating uninterrupted for many
years now, without paying taxes, making a profit at the expense of consumers, healthy
commerce, the local community, Greek economy and employment. They put small
and medium businesses in serious danger, [and] weaken the legal, healthy
commerce...” (in [27]: 34). In a similar vein, the Chair of the Commercial and
Industrial Chamber of Athens, noted that these illegal trade activities involve “...
imported smuggled goods” and what he suggested towards the ‘eradication’ of the
illegal trade was–among other–tighter control of the borders (in [27]: 35).
Thus, it appears that Greece is permeated by perceptions about the ‘organised
criminal Other’, who conspires against the Greek state and society, endangers the
values of the country, transforms the quality of criminality in the country, and
negatively influences the stability of the financial system. Needless to say, despite
the certainly with which the whole issue of ‘organised crime’ was treated by
politicians, media, the public and law enforcement agencies there has been no clear
view as to what ‘organised crime’ really is. It has been largely perceived as a group
of three or more people involved in the smuggling of several commodities, using
violence and corrupting individuals towards amassing huge amounts of money,
which is laundered in various ways. Overall, the issue of ‘organised crime’ and the
involvement of foreigners in ‘organised crime’ have been perceived through the
4 According to Law 2928 on ‘Organised Crime’, which was introduced in 2001 and was heavily
influenced by international efforts to ‘combat organised crime’ such as the UN Convention Against
Transnational Organised Crime, a ‘criminal organisation’ is a structured and with continuous action group
comprising of three or more members.
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prism of threat similarly to other contexts (see, for instance, [52]). Trigazis [49], a
high rank police officer, argued in his report on the organisation of the Greek police
against ‘organised crime’ that the phenomenon of ‘organised crime’ features high on
the list of new dangers after the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the end of Cold War,
Table 2 Arrested migrant smugglers in Greece from January to August 2000 & January to August 2001,
by country of origin
Country of origin January–August 2000 January–August 2001
Albania 116 220
Armenia 5 5
Bangladesh 0 5
Belgium 0 3
Bulgaria 26 33
Czech Republic 2 1
Egypt 0 2
F.Y.R.O. Macedonia 7 5
Germany 1 2
Georgia 3 13
Greece 420 463
Netherlands 4 1
India 3 0
Iraq 21 21
Iran 2 4
Israel 1 0
Italy 1 0
Kazakhstan 1 0
Lebanon 5 0
Lithuania 1 0
Morocco 1 0
Moldova 1 0
Pakistan 4 4
Poland 1 0
Romania 14 9
Russia 12 3
Slovenia 0 1
Sudan 0 1
Sweden 0 2
Syria 4 7
Turkey 53 60
UK 2 0
Ukraine 8 4
Serbia & Montenegro 0 1
Total 719 870
Source: unpublished data obtained from the Greek police in summer 2003
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and that ‘organised crime’ threatens to corrode political institutions and disorganise
economic order and societal cohesion. Simultaneously, however, the lack of
adequate, sound, empirical data on ‘organised crime’, has provided for an obstacle
to a reliable and quality assessment of ‘organised crime’ in the country (see [61]).
I will now turn to the social organisation of three illegal markets in Greece,
namely the migrant smuggling business [6], the cigarette black market [5] and the
market of stolen cars and car parts [4] all of which are based on the available
evidence, in order to examine whether the ‘Alien Conspiracy’ tenets/propositions
suggested directly or indirectly by politicians, the media, the public, and law
enforcement agencies in Greece are present in these markets.
Case study 1–migrant smuggling business
According to unpublished statistics obtained from the Greek police, the majority of
the arrested migrant smugglers in Greece are Greeks. Specifically, they constituted
58.4% of the arrestees in the first 8 months of 2000, and 53.2% in the first 8 months
of 2001. Albanian nationals are also heavily involved in smuggling of migrants
primarily from Albania. In particular they accounted for 16.1% in the first 8 months
of 2000, and 25.2% of the arrestees in the first 8 months of 2001. The third
nationality in terms of arrested migrant smugglers is the Turks since they accounted
for 7.4% and 6.9% of the total arrested human smugglers in the first 8 months of
2000 and 2001, respectively. The Bulgarians, Iraqi, Romanians, and Russians are
also involved, and the rest of the nationalities constitute a small number of cases of
involvement into migrant smuggling (see Table 2).
Due to their significant limitations, the aforementioned statistics should be treated
cautiously. These official statistics omit accounting for a large number of persons
operating in countries other than Greece, something that completely distorts the image
we have for the migrant smuggling networks. Kurdish migrants in Greece as well as the
Kurdish migrant smugglers interviewed, for instance, suggested that in the groups they
were participating there were Pakistani, Syrian and Turkish (as well as Greek) smugglers
involved in a well-coordinated effort. Thus, the fact that most of the individuals arrested
for smuggling of migrants in Greece are Greek nationals, may in fact be the result of
availability/accessibility of these individuals to the Greek authorities.
There is a ‘division of duties’ in migrant smuggling. These include: ‘leader’
(primarily for the Albanian groups), the recruiters, the transporters/guides, and the
scouters, who have the responsibility to provide specific information about the
checks of the police, the borderguards, and the army. The scouters, according to
the police and the interviewed smugglers, are either Greeks, and specifically people
with knowledge of the localities or documented and undocumented migrants, who
have lived in Greece for a lengthy period, so as to enable them to know the localities
and feel comfortable when moving around. Legal entrepreneurs, that is owners of
legal businesses or workers in legal businesses, are also involved in the smuggling
business. These are primarily hotel/house/apartment owners, who provide accom-
modation to migrants while they wait to be smuggled to either another location
within a country or to another country. Legal entrepreneurs may also involve taxi
drivers. The majority of the legal entrepreneurs involved in the migrant smuggling
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business are Greeks. We only came across only a couple of cases in which a foreign
worker in a legal business facilitated the smuggling of migrants.
The recruitment phase is an important part of the smuggling process. It could be
safely argued that rather than the recruiter approaching ‘clients’ most of the times it is
the other way around; the client approaches the smuggler either him/herself or through
his/her social network in the source country. In the transit countries, the recruitment of
migrants to be smuggled involves both the migrants approaching the smuggler(s) and
the smuggler(s) approaching migrants in areas where migrants gather (e.g. port areas).
Prospective smuggled migrants, whether in the source or a transit country, are instructed
as to the place they should gather and are given a specific date and time of departure. A
large part (at least half) or whole of the payment is usually received by the smuggler
before the journey something which does not guarantee that the ‘client’ will reach his/
her destination or, if so, alive and safe. Prospective smuggled individuals sell property or
borrow money from relatives and friends in the country of origin, transit or destination
countries in order to find cash for the journey. If cash is not available then property is
handed over to the smuggler. There is no standard price for smuggling someone into or
out of Greece. This largely depends on the distance, the means of transportation, the
difficulties faced by the smugglers, the time of the year and the weather phenomena, and
the presence of the army, the coast guard and/or the border police, and generally the
complexities of the journey or the nationality of the smuggled individuals. For instance,
Kurdish migrants pay less than migrants of other nationalities such as Indians.
In many instances violence is part of the migrants smuggling process. Smuggling
groups, particularly the Albanian ones, have individuals, who are responsible for
safeguarding the smuggling business through the use of violence or the threat of use
of violence. However, violence is not an indispensible feature of the smuggling
business. Moreover, corruption seems to be an integral part of the smuggling process
when the smuggling involves crossing many transit countries or involves a large
number of individuals. There is evidence of corrupt public officials not only
facilitating the smuggling process or being bribed by primarily Greek smugglers
simply to turn a blind eye but also being actively involved in the process. The
corrupt public officials in Greece are exclusively Greek nationals since foreign
nationals are barred from becoming public servants.
Case study 2–cigarette black market
In 2004 there were 415 cases of cigarette smuggling known to the authorities, and
310,961,785 cigarettes were seized, which amounted for € 31,736,151.34 in evaded
taxes. In 2005 there were 338 known cases of cigarette smuggling, and 258,444,000
cigarettes were seized, which amounted for € 23,895,039.35 in evaded taxes
(Customs Authority [15]). The figures presented above do not provide a picture of
the actual cigarette smuggling in the country, but only those cases that the Greek
authorities come across. There is certainly a dark figure of cigarette smuggling in the
country, and despite the fact that the European Confederation of Cigarette Retailers
(cited in [58]: 12) argues that the illicit market share in Greece in the mid-1990s was
8%, it is impossible, given the quantity and the quality of the current statistical data
and the lack of sophisticated efforts, to validate or disprove such a claim.
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There seems to be a range of ‘entities’ involved in cigarette smuggling that can be
placed on a continuum. The smuggling of cigarettes can be conducted by individuals
or by networks that capitalise on price differentials or need for social enhancement.
There is also a number of ‘actors’ in the cigarette smuggling business in Greece. The
presentation of the division of labour/‘actors’ does not necessarily mean that these
appear in every smuggling network. These ‘actors’ are: the Wholesaler, who buys
and assembles quantities of the merchandise, and distributes them in smaller parts to
the ‘pushers’. The wholesalers are Greeks and there is evidence of some foreign
nationals. For instance in Antonopoulos’ [5] research a Russian and a Polish
wholesaler were identified. There are also the Procurers, who are primarily Greek
businessmen, and who buy large quantities of cigarettes from Greek tobacco
companies with the intention to export them to Balkan countries. Middle-level
smugglers include the Pushers, individuals who introduce the smuggled cigarettes
into the street-level market. We came across pushers from the republics of the former
Soviet Union, Kurdistan, and Greece. The Street-sellers are primarily drawn from
the migrant community of the country and specifically from the community of
migrants (including migrant ethnic Greeks) from the former Soviet and Kurdistan,
and there is a small number of Albanian, Romanian, and Bulgarian migrants. There
is also a small number of Greek Roma involved in the street selling of contraband
cigarettes. The Scouters/Look-Outs warn street-sellers about the presence of the
police in the area, and specifically known to them non-uniformed officers who exert
money from street-sellers, and the Warehouse Guards are responsible for ‘guarding’
the storing places. Scouters/Look-Outs and Warehouse Guards are members of the
migrant community in the country with very few exceptions. Legitimate shop and
kiosk owners are Greeks, who own a shop or a kiosk in or around the street-selling
area and ‘operate’ as a quick ‘refuelling’ point for street sellers, a place of quickly
‘hiding’ the smuggled cigarettes or a distribution point for contraband (as well as
legal) cigarettes. An interesting set of actors in the business are the Thieves/Burglars/
Robbers, ‘professionals’ who steal from warehouses of cigarettes destined for the
legal market or from kiosks and other retail outlets. They are not an integral part of
the cigarette smuggling network and they do not continuously feed the market with
merchandise. We have come across thieves/burglars/robbers from countries of the
former Soviet Union, Albania and Greece. The transportation of the merchandise is
the responsibility of the Drivers/Captains. The majority of truck drivers are Greeks,
and there are a number of Bulgarian, FYROM, Italian, Romanian, Turkish, Polish
and Irish drivers. Captains, according to the available evidence, tend to be Greeks,
Russians, Ukrainians, and Bulgarians. A node of the cigarette smuggling networks
are the ‘Protectors’, who engage in the protection of the interests of cigarette
smuggling business from extortion gangs, primarily of Albanian and Russian origin.
They are also not an integral part of the smuggling and distribution of contraband
cigarettes business. In the current research we came across ‘protectors’ from the
former Soviet Union. In addition, there are a number of Greek ‘protectors’ also
selling protection to establishments of the nocturnal economy. Finally, there are the
corrupt public officials, who they are either actively involved in the cigarette
smuggling business or turn a blind eye to the business. Corrupt public officials
associated with the cigarette smuggling business in Greece include primarily police
officers, customs officers, and coast guards. All corrupt public officials are Greek.
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There are big differences between the socio-economic characteristics of these
actors in the three separate levels of cigarette smuggling (upper, middle and street-
level, see [56]). Upper level smugglers include a wide range of individuals who lead
respectable lives, and have a quite diverse employment and socio-economic
background, whereas the common characteristic of the participants in the street-
level is their socio-economic marginalisation.
The street-level market is largely ignored by law enforcement. However, this is
not the case with the transportation (and warehousing) of contraband cigarettes.
According to data obtained from the Hellenic Coast Guard [22], the majority of
cigarette smugglers arrested by the Coast Guard from 2000 to 2004 are foreign
nationals (70.7%, see Table 3).
It should be noted however, that these figures do not present the actual
representation of foreigners in the cigarette black market in Greece, but simply the
over-representation of foreigners in the transportation of the merchandise, a part of
the business that is vulnerable to apprehension.
The legal sector is heavily involved in the cigarette black market. Similarly to other
contexts (see, for example, [7, 58]) tobacco manufacturers in Greece in essence support
or ‘turn a blind eye’ to cigarette smuggling for their own reasons. Legitimate businesses
such as warehouses, logistics companies and importation/exportations companies are
(knowingly or unknowingly) involved along with retails shops that sell contraband
cigarettes. The contraband cigarettes are distributed in the open and a closed market.
The open market exists in public space in Athens, Thessaloniki and Piraeus and the
closed markets in many cities, towns and resorts throughout the country.
Violence is an extremely rare feature of the cigarette black market in Greece, and
this is one of the reasons the market is largely tolerated by the public and the police.
Violence jeopardises the market by attracting unnecessary attention on the part of
law enforcement agencies, and is therefore “bad for business” ([41]: 42).
Case study 3–stolen car and car parts market
The number of cars that are trafficked is basically the number of cars that are not
recovered. However, the available evidence from the Greek Ministry of Public Order
(MPO) relates to cleared car thefts, which does not automatically mean that the cars
Table 3 Greeks and foreign nationals arrested by the Hellenic Coast Guard for cigarette smuggling,
2000–2004
Greeks Foreign nationals
2000 54 101
2001 7 17
2002 4 37
2003 7 28
2004 12 20
2000–2004 84 203
Source: Hellenic Coast Guard [22]
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are recovered. Nevertheless, according to the police interviewed, the number of
cleared thefts and the recovered cars are about the same. Due to the small
differences, the available official statistics on cleared thefts can offer a valid
representation of the volume of cars stolen in Greece and traded illegally.
From 1998 to 2006, 56,390 cars were stolen. The majority of these thefts were
committed in urban centres and particularly the Greater Athens area. 27,542 car
thefts were not cleared (48.8%). Having the aforementioned data-related issue in
mind, we can consider that about 27,542 cars were not recovered and were thus
illegally traded. It should be noted however, that the number of non-recovered
vehicles as an indication of the volume of illegally traded vehicles in Greece
possesses more limitations:
& Statistics on car thefts in Greece include cars that were stolen within Greece
whereas car trafficking involves cars being stolen in Greece and other countries
or stolen in other countries and traded in Greece.
& A number of cars are stolen in Greece however, there are being traded illegally in
other contexts, as it will be shown.
& There are some cases in which a stolen car is recovered with some parts missing.
These parts have been illegally traded but the vehicle is recovered and there is no
official recording of the parts’ theft.
& Non-recovered cars may be stolen for joyriding or the facilitation of another
criminal activity and be hidden, destroyed or thrown into the sea. Although, as
the police argued, this is rare, their non-recovery does not mean they have been
traded.
There are generally three phases in the car trafficking business. The first phase
involves stealing a car. The second phase involves ‘recycling’ a car by altering the
stolen car’s VIN (Vehicle Identification Number), the 17-digit number, which is
unique for every car, with the VIN of a crashed vehicle of same type and model. The
‘recycling’ of a stolen car can also be achieved by the production of fraudulent car
documents. The final phase involves selling the stolen and ‘recycled’ car. Moreover,
it would be appropriate to add another phase, transportation of stolen cars, for those
cases in which cars are imported/exported into/out of Greece. The theft of a car is
performed primarily by professional thieves. The ‘recycling’ of the stolen cars is
usually performed in garages in various Greek cities and towns many times by
individuals who work legally in the field of car repairs.
Greece is a source, transit and destination country for traded stolen cars. Cars
stolen from Greece are driven to Albania, FYROM, Bulgaria, and Turkey or
transported in containers to countries of the Middle-East. Cars are also stolen from
countries of Western Europe such as Germany, Italy, France, Austria, Belgium, the
Netherlands and Spain and sold to Greece or in (other) Balkan and Eastern European
countries and Turkey, Middle-East and Asia via Greece. Cars or cars parts are sold in
legal used car and/or car part dealerships cheaper than their original prices or their
real price in the market.
From 1998 to 2006, out of the 3,429 offenders known to the police, 1,187
(34.6%) were foreign nationals ([35]; Fig. 1).
This suggests that there is an over-representation of foreigners in the known
offenders in Greece given that, according to the latest census, registered foreigners
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constitute 7.3% of the total population of the country [17]. These figures however,
suffer from a major drawback, namely they refer to known offenders for car thefts. In
consequence, we cannot be certain about whether the foreign nationals are
responsible for stolen cars that are non-recovered, and are, therefore, introduced in
the market of stolen cars. The pre-trial reports obtained by the Greek police suggest
that when foreign nationals steal a car, they abandon it shortly after the theft having
stolen several articles or after having escaped. In addition, according to evidence
from the pre-trial reports, in all cases in which foreign nationals were arrested for car
theft, the cars were found and returned to their legal owners immediately, which
suggests that the VIN was not altered. According to the Greek legislation when the
VIN of a car is altered, the car is forwarded not to its legal owner but to the Public
Property Management Organisation (ODDY in Greek) for auction. Other evidence
such as this provided by interviews with car thieves, however, suggests the
participation of foreign nationals in the theft, recycling and transportation phases of
the business. For example, Russians and Italians are involved in the theft of a car,
whereas Hungarians, Armenians and Georgians-among other—are involved in the
transportation of stolen cars. We have not come across any evidence of the
involvement of foreigners in the sale of stolen cars and car parts in Greece.
Corruption in the car trafficking business in Greece is not a major theme because
instrumental parts of the illegal trade in stolen cars such as the change of VIN, do
not need the contribution of public officials to materialise. In addition, the fact that
the ‘recycling’ and the sale of stolen cars (and car parts) usually take place within
legal businesses explains further why public officials do not come into frequent
adversarial contact with people involved in the trade. Finally, violence is not an
integral part of the car trafficking business. There is no monopoly in the illegal trade
in stolen cars, and stolen cars or stolen car parts are distributed through numerous
Fig. 1 Number of total offenders and number of foreign offenders for car theft in Greece, 1998-2006
Source: Data obtained from [35???]
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legal outlets. There is, therefore, no particular need to control large parts of (stolen)
merchandise or segments of the market.
Discussion
It is evident that the official and ‘unofficial’ discourse on ‘organised crime’ in
Greece has fallen into what Albanese [1] calls “the ethnicity trap”. The perception
that there is an ‘alien conspiracy’ against Greece embodied in ‘organised crime’ and
the establishment of detrimental illegal markets based on specific groups of
foreigners is consolidated in the country. This perception must be seen within the
general context of immigration as well as the immigration—and-crime nexus.
Several variables have been instrumental with the legal framework in Greece (and
the rest of ‘Fortress Europe’) being extremely important. This legal framework greatly
influenced “the opportunity structures of undocumented migrants” (Engbersen and
van der Leun, 1998: 217), and led to the marginalisation and exclusion of immigrants
that were ‘allowed’ to remain in the country. By allowing for very few legal channels
for migration into the country, this legal framework also led to a large number of
migrants resorting to the services of smugglers. The media have played an important
role in this criminalisation process. A ‘moral panic’ about (the ‘organised criminality’
of) migrants has been prevalent in Greece, and the ‘organized criminal Other’ has
been an image prevalent in the media representations on the national and local level
(see, for example, [26, 28]). Unfavourable stereotypical public views about
foreigners can also be observed in Greece (see [2]) some of which are based on
deep historical and social variables, and which have further distanced Greeks and
immigrants socially, and reinforced the exclusionary attitudes and practices towards
migrants.
There are however, issues for discussion in relation to the participation of
foreigners in ‘organised crime’ and illegal markets in particular. As was shown
earlier, there has been a wider official, media and public perception in Greece that
illegal markets are the context of operation of rigid, hierarchical, Mafia-type
organisations. Unlike some other countries this is a mainstream approach to
‘organised crime’, perhaps due to the Greek discourse and policy not placing a focus
on the issue of ‘organise crime’ until recently, as well as the inadequate empirical
research on the topic. However, as it was shown by the presentation of the social
organisation of three illegal markets, this is largely a mistaken perception. No
evidence for mafia-type structures could be found. The important entity in all three
markets is this of the network (see, for example, [44]). The dynamics of the markets
and the context within which these markets take place do not allow for the
establishment of rigid, pyramidal structures. There is no ‘organisation’ or ‘authority’,
which enforces or directs policy and practice to supposedly ‘members’ of such an
‘organisation’. Instead what does exist in the described illegal markets are networks
of action-oriented individuals, who in most instances act for their personal interests
and often on improvisation. Networks are the best vehicle for these illegal businesses
since “…the most reliable flow of supply comes from myriad of small scale,
uncoordinated firms. Having diverse source for the illicit commodities means that if
the regulators knock off one or a few, the market continues uninterrupted” ([8]: 17).
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Similarly, there is no ‘transnational’ authority coordinating each of the illegal
markets presented in the current article something that detracts from the
representation of ‘organised crime’ as an imported feature that is offered by the
MPO’s annual reports on ‘organised crime’. According to van Duyne [52], given
that “…since time immemorial the traffic of most… commodities implies the
crossing of border, it is difficult to understand the added value of the adjective
‘transnational’”. We can pose the same reservation if one considers, for instance, that
evidence of tobacco smuggling involving Greeks has been present long before the
presence of migrant/foreign nationals’ communities in the country. Gardikas [19]
argues that in the 1950s the Greek police had a modus operandi file for smugglers,
which included tobacco and cigarette paper smugglers. This was long before the
transformation of Greece into an immigration country, and the tobacco black market
was certainly not a business controlled by the ‘Other’.
The ethnic make-up of the networks involved in the illegal markets presented in
this article is also a very interesting issue and instrumental for the argument posed.
These networks are ethnically heterogeneous as they involve individuals of various
nationalities, and by no means confine themselves to specific ethnic groups or
‘exclude’ specific ethnic groups (although one may observe the absence of specific
nationalities from specific parts of an illegal market). Such a practice would provide
for an impediment for the business since a number of individuals having the capital,
social relations, and the access to merchandise as well as the abilities to be involved
in the business would be displaced at the expense of the (illegal) market. Foreigners
are involved in the three illegal markets presented here (and indeed other illegal
markets in the country) and many of those serve as important nodes in the networks;
however, by no means foreigners control the three markets presented. At best they
may have some control over individuals who belong to the same ethnic group
forming clusters that are important to the business; or they may control specific parts
of the market. Because of stereotypes, discrimination and other reasons, it is
extremely difficult for foreigners, particularly non-EU nationals, to be involved in
important parts of the illegal businesses. For example, foreigners cannot be involved
in the selling of stolen cars through a used car dealership primarily because migrants
do not own (at least as yet) used car dealerships. Moreover, it is very likely that even
if they owned such a business this would have been either scrutinised by the law
enforcement or looked unfavourably by the Greek buyers. In addition, no foreigners
have ever been accused of corruption in Greece simply because no foreigner can be a
public official.
Greek nationals are heavily involved in different phases and different levels of the
illegal markets presented. For instance, Greek tobacco manufacturers in essence
support the black market in cigarettes for their own objectives, which are—to an
extent –similar to these of the illegal entrepreneurs involved in the cigarette black
market. In addition, Greek used car dealers many times knowingly sell stolen cars,
and Greek hotel/house/apartment owners provide lodging for undocumented
migrants in the smuggling process.
The heavy involvement of Greeks in illegal markets not only signifies that these
illegal markets are not exclusively the business of the ‘Other’ but also offers a very
clear indication of the ways in which the legal and the illegal are increasingly
blurred. There is a wider perception that there is a clear boundary between the legal
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and the illegal market, the upperworld and the underworld [53]. This is not
surprising since, as Edwards and Gill [16] suggest, “this perception of illicit
entrepreneurs operating beyond and outside of the legitimate economy can be
understood as a logical consequence of the perception of criminal organisations as
external interlopers”. In other words the distinction between the upperworld and the
underworld is well placed in the conceptualisation of ‘organised crime’ as a
negative, imported feature associated with the ‘Other’. However, illegal marketers
are there not to subverse the legal system but only to exploit opportunities for profit
and in the same way illegal marketers are benefited by the legal sector, legal
businesses are also benefited by ‘organised crime’ in various ways. The illegal
markets presented in the current article are not always antagonistic or injurious [39]
to their legitimate counterparts or the legal sector as a whole. Criminality in not
completely unknown to legitimate businesses and neither do criminals live off
legitimate business in a parasitic way.
It is questionable whether ‘organised crime’ engages in a campaign to corrupt
public officials, as proposed by ‘Alien Conspiracy Theory’. Firstly, Greek public
officials are not essentially ethical. Over the years, for example, there have been many
cases of police corruption publicized in the Greek media that revealed the accepting of
bribes, erasing fines for traffic offences given to friends and relatives, as well as getting
actively involved in ‘organized criminal activities’ such as drug trafficking, extortion,
trafficking and smuggling of migrants into Greece, and the sex industry. The examples
of police corruption, which mostly have the veil of financial gain, are precipitated by
the low pay of police officer and indeed other law enforcement agents. Secondly, as
was mentioned earlier, corruption of public officials is not essential for illegal
business. It only becomes essential when there is an adversarial confrontation
between illegal marketers and law enforcement agents [30].
Finally, a variable that influences the presence of some (illegal) markets in Greece
is not produced by ‘outsiders’ but by forces that are exclusively Greek. These are, for
instance, the forces of demand for a specific commodity in a market culture (see
[48]). Potter has suggested that “organised crime is an ongoing and continually
developing social process” ([42]: 40), and indeed forms of ‘organised crime’ and/or
illegal markets have to be seen as an integral part of the general social, historical,
legal and economic contexts in the country. For instance, the smuggling of migrants
is a business facilitated by the strict legal framework of immigration in Greece (and
the rest of the western world) that does not leave many options to migrants but to
seek for the services of smugglers. Additionally, the very nature of economic activity
in Greece, involving small-scale family businesses, agriculture, the traditional
existence of the (large) informal economy as well as the reluctance of young Greek
people to be employed in unglamorous and underpaid jobs, create a fertile ground
for the demand of cheap labour [43] supported by the smuggling of migrants.
Similarly, cigarettes constitute a commodity for which there is a very large, receptive
market, which involves “voluntary transfers” and “an implicit notion of fair market
value” ([36]: 85), and is, therefore, received well by large parts of the population. It
is also useful to note that the illegal marketers attempt at exploiting opportunities and
gaining profit by counterbalancing the interventions and restrictions imposed to a
market by the state and authorities themselves, who act as the ultimate “market
determiners” ([54]: 46).
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Conclusion
As the presentation of the three case studies shows, the three particular illegal
markets in Greece are not ‘controlled’ or ‘owned’ by foreigners, and ethnicity as a
social variable in these markets is over-estimated. The current article does not of
course suggest that foreigners are not involved in ‘organised criminal activities’ in
Greece neither completely precludes the possibility that ethnically homogeneous,
hierarchical structures may be present in, ‘control’ or own’ other illegal markets. In
addition, it is not my intention in this paper to discuss the ‘alien conspiracy’ in those
sectors considered as ‘organised crime’ that do not possess entrepreneurial
characteristics. Additional research is needed and recommended not only in the
three particular markets presented in this article but also on other markets such as,
for instance, the drugs and arms markets in Greece as well as ‘organised criminal
activities’ that do not display entrepreneurial characteristics such as extortion and
violence. Within such a research nexus, the role of foreigners and the patterns of
cooperation among groups of foreigners, and between foreigners and Greeks in these
markets and activities must emerge as one of the primary objectives. Understanding
the conditions under which illegal market associational and organizational structures,
which are more complex than the two extremes (Mafia–Networks), emerge is also an
interesting and important issue to be researched.5 The ‘conspiring criminal alien’ is
an image well integrated in the Greek social consciousness, and one that has led to
the further criminalisation and victimisation of foreigners in the country (see, for
example, [3]) particularly the non-EU nationals or nationals from ‘non-respectable
countries’. We can only agree with Paoli and Reuter [38] in that “the relationship
between ethnic minorities and crime…is too important to be left solely to moral
entrepreneurs”.
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